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The following lecture was given at the University of Dayton on 
the occasion of the presentation of the Marianist Award to 
Marcia L. Co/ish, February, 17, 2000. 
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Catholic and Intellectual: 
Conjunction or Disjunction? 
My title, "Catholic and Intellectual: Conjunction or Disjunc-
tion?" directs attention to the copula, "and." Does this word bind 
"Catholic" and "Intellectual" in a harmonious and mutually support-
ive union? Or, does it place these terms in an either/or, contrasting, 
or even confrontational stance? To be sure, some non-Catholics opt 
for the second interpretation. As they see it, if one is a Catholic, one 
has to cash in one's brains. In particular, if one is a Catholic theolo-
gian, one is constrained to play Charlie McCarthy to the Edgar Bergen 
of whoever occupies the throne of Peter, or his self-appointed script-
writer. Oddly enough, this same attitude can also be found in some 
Catholic circles, on the part of some would-be ventriloquists and 
those they have managed to convince. Proponents of this view also 
seek to obfuscate the distinction between the creeds of the Church 
and the handful of infallible papal rulings made since 1870 and the 
large number of other doctrines which Catholic theologians may 
legitimately debate and on which they, and the rest of the faithful, 
may hold their own positions. 
How should Catholic academics who want to dissociate them-
selves from intra-confessional, anti-intellectualism go about it? In 
reflecting on· these matters, it occurred to me that my own aca-
demic specialty, medieval intellectual history, provides some valu-
able insights and rationales. At the same time, it occurred to me that 
it would be worth considering how more recent thinkers had ad-
dressed this, and related, themes. So I decided to consult two pre-
vious commentators on the university and the church-related uni-
versity, John Henry Newman and Jaroslav Pelikan. Newman pub-
lished his Tbe Idea of a University in 1855 and Pelikan published his 
reflections on tqat book, Tbe Idea of a Univeriity: A Reexamination, 
in 1992. Although separated by the Atlantic and by almost 150 years, 
these authors, I found, had much to say of interest on this topic and 
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to this audience, and much that I could use as the springboard for 
my own reflections on the subject. 
First, Newman. Particular historical circumstances inspired him 
to write Tbe Idea of a University. In the 1850s, in England, one had 
to be a communicant of the Anglican fhurch in order to study and 
teach at a university. Indeed, Newman's conversion to Catholicism 
forced him to resign his fellowship at Oriel College, Oxford. In 
response to this situation, which effectively barred non-Anglicans 
from the learned professions unless they had studied abroad, the 
decision was made by the Irish hierarchy to found a Catholic uni-
versity in that part of the British Isles. Newman served as its first 
rector. It was in connection with this assignment that he outlined 
what we would call today the "mission statement" of the Irish Catholic 
University, in the lectures and occasional pieces published as Tbe 
Idea of a University. In short, rather than projecting a Platonic ideal 
of a university, Newman ·aimed at explaining the policies he actu-
ally intended to implement in this newly launched institution. 
There are a number of key themes Newman emphasizes in 
describing the educational objectives of the new university, many 
of which still merit our consideration. The Irish Catholic University, 
he notes, teaches the liberal arts and also has faculties for special-
ized post-graduate study in the sciences, medicine, and law, equip-
ping degree recipients to enter the learned professions. The univer-
sity teaches theology as well, not only as a post-graduate discipline 
but also as a branch of liberal studies. Newman stresses the idea 
that theology should be taught as a university discipline; he does 
not want to see it ghettoized in seminaries or monasteries, aimed 
exclusively at the vocational formation of clergy-in-training. In this 
connection, Newman looks back to theology as a university disci-
pline in medieval scholasticism, while at the same time he antici-
pates religious studies as a branch of the humanities, themes to 
which I will return. 
While he certainly pays attention to the learned disciplines that 
lead to prof~ssional accreditation, Newman's primary concern is 
the BA curriculum, the liberal arts, and the qualities of mind they 
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should impart, whether or not students go on to post-graduate work. 
In the academic jargon of today, Newman is interested in "out-
comes assessment," that is, what undergraduates actually retain af-
ter commencement day. His term for this is Liberal Knowledge. 
Liberal Knowledge, as Newman defines it, has two critical aspects. 
First, it produces the habits of mind and modes of behavior that 
characterize the gentleman-a term both gender-specific an:d class-
specific in Newman's historical context. If we want to subscribe to 
this notion we will also certainly want to qualify Newman's con-
cept, making it more inclusive. Second, desirable as these attain-
ments may be, Newman argues that intellectual virtue should not 
be confused with moral virtue. To be sure, intellectual virtue can, 
and should, be put to the service of moral ends. But, in and of itself, 
it is morally neutral. It may also be put to the service of greed, 
destructiveness, and the libido dominandi. By itself, intellectual vir-
tue does not add one jot or tittle to the moral stature of its pos-
sessor. Nor is it proof against the passions and sinful impulses that 
incline fallen humanity to folly and vice. 
For Newman, then, a church-related university is not, automati-
cally, a school for virtue. Nor should it be envisioned as such. I'd 
like to read a fairly lengthy quotation from Tbe Idea of a University 
in which Newman lays this point on the line: 
Knowledge is one thing, virtue is another; good sense is not con-
science, refinement is not humility, nor is largeness and justice of 
view faith. Philosophy, however enlightened, however profound, 
gives no command over the passions, no influential motives, no 
vivifying principles .... It is well to have a cultivated intellect, a 
delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble 
and courteous bearing in the conduct of life; these are the 
connatural 'ualities of a large knowledge; they are the objects of a 
University; ... but ... they are no guarantee for sanctity or even for 
conscientiousness .... Their admirers persist in arrogating for them 
a praise to which they have no claim. Quarry the granite rock 
·with razors, or moor the vessel with a thread of silk; then may you 
hope with such keen and delicate instruments as human knowl-
edge and reason to contend against those giants, the passions and 
the pride of man .... To open the mind, to correct it, to refine it, to 
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enable it to know, to digest, master, rule, and use the knowledge, 
to give it power over its own faculties, application, flexibility, 
method, and critical exactness, sagacity, resource, address, elo-
quent expression, is an object as intelligible as the cultivation of 
virtue, while, at the same time, it is absolutely distinct from it. 1 
While agreeing that Liberal Knowl~dge can serve morality and 
religion, then, Newman also notes that it can be used by scoffers 
and critics of morality and religion. With respect to the Christian 
tradition, he concludes, Liberal Knowledge "proves, in the event, 
sometimes its serviceable ally, sometimes ... an insidious and dan-
gerous foe." 2 
Having thus crisply dissociated himself from the ancient Greek 
philosophical maxim,· "to virtue, knowledge," Newman turns to 
another of his central concerns, what he calls the duties of the 
church toward knowledge, in a church-related university. In this 
connection, his prescriptions have a strikingly modern look and are 
fully applicable today. Newman begins by observing that all the 
arts and sciences, be they secular or theological, have their own 
proper methods and criteria, their own scope and legitimacy in 
their own spheres. He is vigorously opposed to reductionism of 
any kind, from whatever quarter. Practitioners in all fields, he ar-
gues, must recognize, and respect, the norms and procedures fol-
lowed in other fields. It follows, from this principle, that the univer-
sity does not delimit or censor what is studied or what books are to 
be read. It is interesting to note, here, that Newman sees the great-
est challenge to Christianity as coming from the arts and humani-
ties, not from the natural sciences. In digesting that fact, it is worth 
keeping in mind that Newman wrote before the Darwinian revolu-
tion. And, he is a throwback to the view that Aristotle is the "master 
of those who'know" in the sciences, Galileo, Newton, and others to 
the contrary notwithstanding. In addressing the challenge of litera-
ture and the arts to the church, Newman points out that the sources 
of these disciplines are diverse. They record and display the human 
condition, in its depravity as well as in its grandeur. This fact, he 
emphasizes, goes with the territory of Liberal Knowledge. Accept it 
as such, he <;ounsels. Do not teach expurgated texts or put mental 
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' fig-leaves on the nudes. Regarding literature, he advises, "Put up 
with it, as it is', or do not pretend to cultivate it. Take things as they 
are, not as you would wish them."3 The church-related university, 
in sum, fears no form of knowledge. It represses no element of our 
nature. Rather, it "cultivates the whole."4 "Right-on!" we might agree, 
today. 
If Newman were addressing my topic, "Catholic and Intellec-
tual: Conjunction or Disjunction?," it is clear that his position would 
be "both/and" rather than one or the other. Well before the pessi-
mism about reason, science, and technology brought on in the twen-
tieth century by their blatant abuse by totalitarian despots and war-
mongers, Newman displays a keen sensitivity to the fact that Liberal 
Knowledge can be exploited, perverted, and applied to evil ends. 
The possession of Liberal Knowledge does not, in itself, make a 
person a better member of his or her faith community, a better 
person in God's sight. Thus, Newman posits a distinction between 
intellectual and moral virtue, insisting that they are not the same 
and that they do not automatically conduce to each other. At the 
same time, the church, and the church-related university committed 
to propagating Liberal Knowledge, must not fear, repress, censor, 
or subject to external criteria any of the arts or sciences. Such a 
university must cultivate all aspects of educational endeavor, ac-
knowledging each discipline's distinctive ground-rules, in order to 
cultivate the whole. In that respect, the copula in "Catholic and 
Intellectual" would be, for Newman, a conjunction as well as a 
.disjunction. And, the disjunction, where it exists for him, speaks 
less to the limits of human reason than to the distinction he draws 
between intellectual and moral virtue. 
I'd now like to turn to Pelikan's reconsideration of Newman. He 
speaks both as a professor and as a former graduate school dean. 
Just as there are features of Newman's outlook that reflect his his-
torical situation and personal proclivities, so there are features of 
Pelikan's outlook that bespeak his personal experience and the 
general situation of American universities in the late twentieth cen-
tury. Thus, Pelikan treats some issues-boards of trustees and their 
proper relations with university administrators and faculty, the re-
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sponsibility of university presidents for sound fiscal management, 
intercollegiate athletics as big business with all the temptations there-
unto appertaining-that are remote from Newman's purview. I plan 
to ignore these dimensions of Pelikan's essay, focusing instead on 
the areas in which his position can best be compared with Newman's, 
and best serve as a backdrop for my'bwn reflections. 
First, and in sharp contrast with Newman's rigorous distinction 
between intellectual and moral virtue, Pelikan thinks that universi-
ties must subscribe to and inculcate virtues that are both intellectual 
and moral. He heads the list with freedom of inquiry and intellec-
tual honesty. Next, he observes, scholars have a moral as well as a 
professional duty to publish the results of their research, in a form, 
and a forum, where they. can be evaluated by peers. What is at 
issue here, for Pelikan, is not just the duty of the professoriate to 
advance knowledge in addition to imparting it to their students. 
Nor is he seeking merely to develop an ethical rationale for the 
"publish or perish" policy of the research university. Beyond that, 
Pelikan argues that the willingness to subject one's work to peer 
review is a control and a corrective against intellectual hubris, self-
satisfaction, and complacency. On this topic, Pelikan indicates that 
he is as interested in the psychology of the professoriate, and the 
temptations confronting it, as much as he is in what a university 
education does for students. He makes a valid point, I think, in 
arguing that professors cannot be good role models for students 
unless they take intellectual risks and push the envelope them-
selves. 
Thus, another intellectual virtue that is also a moral virtue for 
Pelikan is courage, the ability to stick to one's guns, if one is a 
revisionist, or swimming against the current, and also the willing-
ness to modify or abandon one's position if it is proved wrong, 
however large an ego-investment one may have in one's older views. 
As with his point about submitting one's work to peer review, 
Pelikan's argument here stresses the humility and selflessness of the 
researcher in the quest for knowledge as a moral, and not just a 
professional, requirement. It also stresses the point that, in academia, 
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authority is not ex officio; it is possessed only when it is earned, in 
the eyes of those-competent to judge. 
Pelikan certainly shares Newman's appreciation of the fact that 
different disciplines have their own procedures, methods, and cri-
teria, and that members of a university must understand and re-
spect that fact. But, once again, in addition to seeing this attitude as 
a moral no less than an intellectual virtue, Pelikan puts his own 
spin on the point. Unlike Newman, he does not focus on the re-
sponsibility to the disciplines of the university's administration, or 
its chartering body. Rather, he focuses on academic collegiality. It is 
professors and students who have the duty to recognize both the 
pluralistic and the universalistic dimensions of human nature and 
experience. They must be able to distinguish between ideas which 
they may feel a duty to attack and the persons who articulate those 
ideas. For Pelikan, a central feature of the university's mission is "to 
tolerate fundamental diversity of beliefs and values without sacrific-
ing conviction .... What is needed is the skill and the art of holding 
views strongly and yet of respecting views that are diametrically 
opposed. This skill is one with which the university has had a 
rich experience. It involves a civility of discourse; ... the discourse 
that goes on within the university may serve as the most impressive 
exhibit available to prove that civility is in fact the best means 
that human reason has devised ... for coping with fundamental 
differences. "5 
I daresay that Pelikan's insistence on the importance of civility 
can be contextualized when we recall the frequent trashing of that 
virtue, in the academy and in society at large, since the 1960s. Had 
he been able to read Pelikan's book, I think that Newman would 
have found this insistence on civility both surprising and shocking. 
But, apart from his general claim that there are moral as well as 
intellectual virtues specific to the university's mission, Pelikan makes 
this observation about civility because he sees the university as the 
last bastion of rationality and courtesy in a world intellectually di-
minished by ideological bickering, the latest fads in cultural criti-
cism, and the dumbing down of public discourse. 
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Going beyond that, Pelikan maintains that the virtues he sees as 
central to the university's mission are an integral part of ethics in 
general. They set the operative standards for us as academics, in 
whatever faith community we stand and in whatever kind of uni-
versity we teach. In that sense, although Pelikan is not writing spe-
cifically about or for church-r~lated universities, he does see the 
academic virtues as religiously significant, whatever an academic's 
personal convictions may be. I think that Pelikan makes a valid 
point here. I would agree that the integrity with which we do our 
work has a moral dimension, for all academics, and that it also has 
a religious dimension for those of us who place our professional 
labors in the framework of a divine reality that is our ultimate source 
of meaning. Pelikan is also concerned with how universities ad-
dress the failure of some academics to uphold the intellectual and 
moral virtues of the academy, how they enforce academic freedom, 
and its flip side, academic responsibility. Thus, unlike Newman, 
Pelikan treats university governance,' the legislation of principles 
and guidelines, both substantive and procedural, and their applica-
tion, without fear or favor, to those who fall short. I would add a 
point here that Pelikan omits. Even the most cursory review of the 
horror stories in the AAUP journal indicates that supra-university 
watchdog agencies and pressure groups also need to exist, to guard 
the on-campus guardians of academic freedom and responsibility. 
Finally, although Pelikan writes about universities in general 
and not, specifically, about church-related universities, he does con-
sider the relationship of the church to the university. On this sub-
ject, he takes a far bolder line than Newman. Pelikan argues that 
the church needs the university more than the university needs the 
church. And why? So that the church can understand its own mes-
sage, the development of its own teachings and practices, and the 
ways in which they have been enculturated (to use a sociological 
term) or incarnated (to use a theological term) in different times 
and places. This understanding, in turn, is essential if the church is 
going to find the best ways to preach the Gospel in the present and 
future. To this end, Pelikan continues, the church needs the help of 
many university disciplines. It needs linguistic and philological ex-
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pertise, which enable it to reconstruct and interpret its foundation 
documents. It needs history, comparative religion, psychology, and 
the social sciences, which help the church understand the develop-
ment of its theology in context. I would concur. For we are educat-
ing students to understand their own traditions, and all vital and 
durable traditions are complex, in their histories, and multiform, in 
their modes of praxis. We are also educating students to be citizens 
of a pluralistic society; thus they need to have a knowledge and 
understanding of other people's religious traditions. In the case of 
students who are Catholics, we need to prepare them to embrace 
the ecumenical imperatives of Vatican II. To return to Pelikan, he 
adds that the church also needs philosophy and the sciences, which 
give it a vocabulary enabling it to make its theology comprehen-
sible and defensible in the intellectual community. 
In making this point, Pelikan speaks to two historical facts which 
I would corroborate: First, for the most part, universities today no 
longer depend on churches as their sponsors. And, in the case of 
universities that do, they are on notice that the church-related uni-
versity is not the only game in town. In order to hold up their heads 
with pride, such universities have to subscribe to the same intellec-
tual values and, in Pelikan's case, virtues, that define the university 
as such. If not, their personnel will simply move elsewhere and 
make their pedagogy available in contexts not subject to ecclesias-
tical oversight. Second, ecclesiastical tradit~ons have never been 
static or monolithic. They have always embraced multiple interpre-
tations of authority and they have had to reinvent themselves re-
peatedly in order to "speak to" different cultures and mind-sets. 
Pelikan emphasizes the point that churches need what university 
education can supply since, as the vehicles of living traditions, they 
must undergo development lest they atrophy. In sum, Pelikan weaves 
into the theme of the church's need for the university a master 
pattern: Newman's own view of the development of doctrine. 
I find that both Newman and Pelikan offer us much food for 
thought. If Newman is prophetic in his skepticism about the auto-
matic application of Liberal Knowledge to good causes, Pelikan's 
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confidence that intellectual virtues are moral virtues also rings true, 
even though he wisely qualifies the point by recognizing that pro-
fessors share the temptations of fallen humanity: they may be vain, 
proud, envious, manipulative, and selfish. In addition to accultura-
tion, universities need to provide clear academic ground-rules in 
order to thwart these proclivities ancf; at worst, to penalize them. 
Both authors emerge as realists. Neither is suckered by the Enlight-
enment myth of the inevitable march of progress through reason 
and science. Both see a place for theology in the intellectual dis-
course of the university; both see the university as standing above 
and apart from theology as confessional drum-beating, masquerad-
ing as scholarship. Both treat theology as a humanistic discipline 
operating under the same academic ground-rules as other humanis-
tic disciplines. Both consider the church in relation to the univer-
sity. Newman sees the church-related university as having a duty to 
support Liberal Knowledge; Pelikan sees the church, whether in 
church-supported universities or not, as having a need for the 
university's support. As I see it, both perspectives have merit, and 
they do not contradict each other. Finally, both Newman and Pelikan 
are aware of the fact that the defense of academic freedom and the 
respect for the independence of the scholarly disciplines, values 
defining the modern university in whatever setting, derive from the 
medieval university. I agree with that idea but, as a medievalist, I 
would amplify it, arguing that the medieval university can best be 
understood as the culmination, for its time, of a longer historical 
tradition that goes back to the early church. Church-related univer-
sities are, historically, the primogenitary heirs of that tradition and 
should be its strongest defenders, however much some of them 
may try to ignore that legacy, and however much external influ-
ences may seek to induce memory-loss. 
The medieval model begins in the patristic period. Initially, early 
Christians sent their children to the state-supported schools of lib-
eral arts, rather than setting up a parallel educational system con-
veying literacy in Greek and Latin with bowdlerized versions of 
classical authors. As a product and exponent of the classica.l school, 
St. Augustine, considering the education men preparing to be bibli-
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cal exegetes and preachers would need, included the entire classi-
cal curriculum, omitting astrology alone. With respect to these cul-
tural riches, he advises his students to "spoil the Egyptians of their 
gold and silver" as they bring it into the Promised Land.6 By the 
sixth century, the state-supported classical schools were gone in 
the wake of the Roman Empire. The locus of schooling in the lib-
eral arts shifted to monasteries. The prevailing spirit of the new 
monastic schoolmasters is summed up well by Cassiodorus. Re-
flecting on the role of the classics in monastic education, he ex-
presses the firm conviction that the preservation of liberal culture is 
a responsibility of Christian educators: "May the task of the ancients 
be our task,"7 he exhorts his readers. Picking up on the same theme, 
the twelfth-century educator Hugh of St. Victor proposes, "Learn 
everything. You will see afterwards that nothing is superfluous. A 
skimpy knowledge is not a pleasing thing,"8 in the model curricu-
lum of arts and sciences he drafted for the neophyte biblical schol-
ars of his own day. 
The same century in which Hugh wrote saw the first emergence 
of the universities and of the scholastic method that flourished there. 
Notwithstanding the episcopal umbrella under which most early 
universities arose, bY. the early thirteenth century, if not before, they 
had acquired corporate liberties freeing them from the control of 
church and state alike. As autonomous corporations, universities, 
and their sub-corporations in individual faculties, determined their 
own curricula, the requirements for degrees, the ways of testing the 
competence _of candidates for them, and the modes of policing 
their own ranks. On the few occasions when popes or princes tried 
to intervene and prescribe loyalty tests, the influence of these exter-
nal authorities was generally nugatory; at most, it shifted the action, 
or some personnel, to other university centers. In practice, as in 
principle, universities defended and institutionalized the twelfth-
century precept defining intellectual life: diversi, sed non adversi.9 
In all faculties, from the arts curriculum to the post-graduate fields 
of medicine, law, and theology, there were always several masters 
teaching the same subjects, each with his own interpretation of the 
material. It was ack~owledged that unity did not require unifor-
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mity; a plurality of positions could coexist within the orthodox con-
sensus, even in the high-risk fields of theology and canon law. In 
working out their individual positions, scholastics in all fields de-
veloped a critical method, based on the consideration of reason 
and authority alike. They felt free, even obliged, to analyze the 
foundation documents within their disciplines, applying logical, his-
torical, and philosophical criticism to bear on them, deciding which 
authorities remained pertinent and which needed to be 
contextualized, relativized, put on the shelf, or even rejected. Even 
while advocating rival solutions to the same problems, medieval 
academics could preserve collegiality, and a strong sense of their 
collective identity, despite the argumentative style that marked scho-
lastic debate. 
It is out of this tradition that we derive our treasured right of 
academic freedom and our commitment to intellectual courage and 
honesty, our respect for colleagues in different disciplines, as well 
as for the work of colleagues in our own fields with whom we 
disagree. These are values to which both Newman and Pelikan 
speak. It is out of this tradition, as well, that the concept of aca-
demic responsibility derives: our duty to uphold standards, our duty 
not to turn the power of the podium in our classrooms into a bully 
pulpit, our duty not to debase the teacher-student relationship into 
a relationship of guru and groupie. This is the legacy that we all 
inherit. The Catholic university and the Catholic professoriate in-
herit it in particular. We have the obligation to embody and defend 
it, whatever kinds of colleges and universities may employ us. 
Whatever our affiliations, we also have the obligation to be good 
citizens of our academic communities, recognizing that eternal vigi-
lance is the price of liberty, academic and otherwise. This may 
mean that we have to remind our colleagues, our administrators, 
and the ecclesiastical bodies to which they report in some cases, 
that they, too, have a duty to be faithful to the tradition of the 
medieval university that is their own richest inheritance. If they are 
laggard in that duty, if they try to dismiss it as passe, we have the 
responsibility to recall them to it, to embarrass them for neglecting 
it, and even to hold their collective feet to the fire, if necessary. It is 
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to be hoped that drastic action of this soh will not be required. For 
if Catholic academics are clear about these values and solid in their 
willingness to promote them and to hold their leaders ae<;:ountable 
to them, we can keep the flag aloft. After all, without us, neither the 
church nor the university can carry out its educational mission. For 
me, therefore, the motto which that flag proudly proclaims is: Catholic 
and Intellectual: Conjunction not Disjunction! 
19 
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THE MARIANIST AWARD 
Each year the University of Dayton presents the Marianist Award 
to a Roman Catholic distinguished for achievement in scholarship 
and the intellectual life. 
. Established in 1950, the award was originally presented to indi-
viduals who made outstanding contributions to Mariology. In 1967, 
the concept for the award was broadened to honor those people 
who had made outstanding contributions to humanity. The award, 
as currently given, was reactivated in 1986. 
The Marianist Award is named for the founding religious order 
of the University of Dayton, the Society of Mary (Marianists). The 
award carries with it a stipend of $5,000. 
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THE MARIANIST AWARD 
1950 Juniper Carol, O.F.M. 
1951 Daniel A. Lord, S.] 
1952 Patrick Peyton C.S.C. 
1953 Roger Brien 
1954 Emil Neubert 
1955 Joseph A. Skelly 
1956 Frank Duff 
1957 JohnMcShain 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1967 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
Eugene F. Kennedy, Jr. 
Winifred A. Feely 
Bishop John F. Noll 
Eamon R. Carroll, 0. Carm. 
Coley Taylor 
Rene Laurentin 
Philip C. Hoelle, S.M. 
Cyril 0. Vollert, S.J. 
Eduardo Frei-Montalva 
John Tracy Ellis 
Rosemary Haughton 
Timothy O'Meara 
Walter]. Ong, S.]. 
Sidney Callahan 
John T. Noonan, Jr. 
Louis Dupre 
Monika Hellwig 
Philip Gleason 
]. Bryan Hehir 
Charles Taylor 
Gustavo Gutierrez 
David W. Tracy 
Jill Ker Conway 
Marcia L. Colish 
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